wealth of messages that could prove very helpful and important to our modern world if they were simply extracted from the wrapping of scholarly mumbojumbo that surrounds them. She no doubt has a point: it is a rare scholarly treatment of the Analects that is able to communicate the basic messages of the work to a layperson in a succinct and accessible fashion. This lively book, written in a popular, self-help style, succeeds in making important aspects of traditional Confucianism vivid for the contemporary reader in a way that more technical treatments simply could not match. In other respects, however, the popularization drive at times undermines the original goal: by turning Confucius into a self-help guru-a spokesman for "enlightened self-interest, " dispensing practical advice on how to climb the corporate ladder effectively-some genuinely important messages that Confucianism has for the modern Westerner become obscured.
Each section is introduced by a set of passages from the Analects, based on James Legge's translation, but also echoing at times the contemporary style of Simon Leys, whom the author also consulted. The renderings are generally quite loose, at times overly so. For instance, Analects 6.16 reads in the original something like: "These days it is hard to get by without possessing the glibness of Priest Tuo or the physical beauty of Song Chao, " two unsavory historical characters of whom Confucius clearly disapproved. The comment itself is obviously a complaint-in Confucius's corrupt age, superficial appeal substitutes for substanceand is part of a general theme in the Analects concerning the danger of glibness and physical beauty. Berthrong renders the passage, "A silver tongue and a comely face can make getting along with others a little easier, " which rather subverts the message, putting Confucius in the position of advocating glibness as a helpful social lubricant. For the most part, though, Berthrong's version of the Analects works quite well, and these impressionistic renderings of the text are perhaps the best feature of the book-preserving the basic sentiments of the original Chinese, but rendering it in a lively, idiomatic form that speaks much more directly and clearly to the modern ear. Analects 17.24, for instance, reads in her version:
A civilized person should despise those who proclaim others' shortcomings, those in low stations who slander their superiors, those who are brave but lack proper behavior, those who rush into action without thinking, the rigid of mind, those who steal others' ideas and pretend they are their own, those who think haughtiness is courage, and those who spout gossip as truth.
Some of the translations of technical terms, for instance junzi 君子 as "civilized person, " are also very effective-less historically accurate than "gentleman, " perhaps, but also presenting less of a barrier to the modern reader, while still effectively conveying the basic range of the term.
The body of the text that follows the quotations consists of Berthrong's commentary, which attempts to relate them to issues that are likely to concern the average white-collar, Western professional: someone attempting to balance personal and professional life, get along with others, and advance up the institutional or corporate hierarchy. At its best, this commentary makes the spirit of Confucius's teaching come alive for the average reader in a way that simply cannot be achieved by a traditional scholarly approach. For instance, Berthrong presents a scenario involving a spiteful aunt who sends, as a belated wedding gift, a $15 gift certificate for a store in receivership. Natural responses might include returning the gift with a dismissive note or simply tossing it in the trash. A third possibility, though, would be to "thank Aunt Jane profusely and let her know what a farsighted financial expert she is" for allowing her nephew and new wife to acquire "a bedroom suite originally priced at $500 for her $15 because the store was about to close its doors" (pp. 28-29). This kind of elegant, "civilized" response-pointedly gracious, allowing the offender an opportunity to experience shame without being humiliated-is typical of the Confucian spirit. More generally, Berthrong makes some quite perceptive and eloquent observations concerning the enduring significance of Confucianism, despite the massive technological and social changes that have occurred between Confucius's time and our own:
This ancient tradition has survived intact for an excellent reason: it can still be applied to contemporary work and life situations. The fundamental nature of human beings has not changed. We might have more creature comforts now, such as computers and indoor plumbing, but are we any smarter, more able to handle life's curveballs; do we suffer less from anxiety, greed, or that more vague malaise, feelings of inadequacy? The light bulb only dispels literal darkness; it does not cure us of stupidity or ignorance. (p. 5) This is a helpful and important observation, and there are many more like it. My one concern with this book, however, is the manner in which these sorts of genuine insights into the Analects and their potential significance for modern life are often mixed with self-help advice that, though perhaps laudable in itself, seems incompatible with the basic teachings of Confucianism. For instance, at one point Berthrong writes, "Socrates said, 'Know thyself, ' but Confucius would add to that, 'Teach yourself. ' . . . The civilized person is on a personal journey of discovery that lasts as long as life and goes wherever the individual wants" (p. 40). This is a sentiment that would have, in fact, horrified Confucius. The aspiring junzi is to commit himself to the one and only traditional Way of Heaven and to be reshaped by it, submitting as well to the authority of the teacher and the indispensable guidance of his practice community. Trying to learn on one's own is characterized as being "perilous" (2.15), fruitlessly exhausting (15.31), and likened to "standing with one's face to a wall" (17.10).
The idea of learning as a "personal journey of discovery, " taking the individual wherever he or she wants to go, is precisely the sort of modern Western liberal conceit that a careful study of Confucianism can help to correct and balance.
On the other hand, comments like this, which seem rather opposed in spirit to what Confucius had in mind, are frequently followed by passages that do a wonderful job of capturing the Confucian ethos. For instance, the description of the journey of personal learning is followed by the advice to "take Confucius's way and consider the world your classroom and everyone in it your teachers. No need for pedantry-just keep your eyes and ears open all of the time and your mouth closed most of the time" (p. 41). The Master could not have said it better. A similar example can be found a few pages later, where we are told that "Confucius would never advise you to care less about your family, but he would say that they deserve the freedom to be the human beings they are" (p. 43). This sounds more like est-psychology from the 1970s than the sentiment of a man who advocated strict adherence to role-specific norms of behavior and who never hesitated to tell people what to do. It is followed, though, by advice that appears to capture something about the way that Confucius felt a perfected human being needed to look within and take responsibility for the success or failure of interpersonal relations: "You, the civilized person, can advise, sympathize, and listen patiently, but in the end you cannot control the actions of others, be they fellow workers, your offspring, or your mate. What you can control is your own attitudes and actions.
Your family deserves your most civilized behavior. Give it to them" (p. 44). This is a nice updating of sentiments expressed in passages such as 4.17: "When you see someone who is unworthy, use this as an opportunity to look within yourself. "
Other examples in the book where Berthrong attributes to Confucius positions that seem quite opposed to the spirit of the Analects include the following observation:
The problem with digging in our heels and resisting every change, which is in itself a neutral act-neither good nor bad, but dependent on the circumstances and what we make of them-is that no matter what we do or think, we cannot prevent change. Change will penetrate any and all defenses, including ignorance and determined clinging to the "old ways. " (pp. 11-12) The Confucian way, we are told, is to ignore the arguments of traditionalists and to embrace change "with our minds open and senses tingling" (p. 12). Now, if there is anyone in the entire history of human thought who would proudly confess to clinging to the "old ways, " it is Confucius. Berthrong's advice to embrace change excitedly is familiarly modern, self-help wisdom, but I am at a loss to see how it could plausibly be attributed to a man who, at his most radically icono-clastic, reluctantly agreed to go along with changing the type of fabric used to make a ritual cap (9.3). Similarly, throughout the book, the wisdom of Confucius is presented as strategic advice for climbing the corporate ladder, which again seems rather anathema to the spirit of a man who saw official position and salary as, at best, subsidiary external rewards accruing to the gentleman, but more commonly as insidious temptations leading people astray from the Way of Heaven.
The idea that "the Analects is, at bottom, about how we can learn to live with each other with a minimum of conflict . . . fueled by enlightened self-interest" (p. 10) says more about our own modern Western ideals than anything that would make sense to the editors of the Analects. Similarly, anyone who thinks that Confucius would endorse the typical liberal notion that "clothes do not make the man" that plague developed Western nations, adding parenthetically that "it must be noted that the dictators in Singapore, Rangoon, and Beijing also claim, dubiously, that they honor the mandates of the master" (p. xv). I am not convinced that this claim is so dubious. The paternalistic authoritarianism that Reid so deplores in societies such as Singapore is arguably not the result of ignoring what Confucius had to say, but rather listening to him too well.
Berthrong follows Reid in seeing traditional Confucianism as a thoroughly unproblematic corrective to perceived flaws in modern Western liberal systems. For instance, in the course of arguing that employees should be retained based upon their actual productivity rather than their seniority, Berthrong observes in an aside that Lest anyone think that this is an anti-union sentiment, let me say that the ideal of humane treatment of all would alleviate the current need for laws governing fair dealings with employees; rules about harassment; discrimination in all its forms; and, finally, job tenure. In fact, truly humane treatment of employees by bosses would probably make trade unions unnecessary. (p. 72) The Confucian ideal of rule by persons rather than institutional structure and law arguably has much to do with the prevalence of cronyism, nepotism, and corruption in contemporary East Asian societies, and I, for one, am in no hurry to scrap western liberal institutions in favor of simple faith in the humane motivations of my superiors. Scholars with a communitarian vision inspired by traditional Confucianism, such as Henry Rosemont Jr. and Roger Ames, have done much to point out the limitations and tensions built into modern Western liberal societies, which certain aspects of Confucianism-properly understood-could play a role in helping to correct. No one is well served, however, by an unrealistic, romanticized vision of what a society run according to the principles of the Analects might look like. Jeffersonian democracy, as Reid appears to suggest (pp. xvii-xviii), is not the first thing that springs to mind.
The scholarly pedant in me also cannot resist noting several minor but grating factual errors. For instance, the doctrine that "all is flux, nothing stays still" is attributed to Plato (p. 130)-and by implication Confucius as well-when it is, in fact, the famous doctrine of Heraclitus, and, moreover, anathema to everything Plato or Confucius taught. Another example is found near the end of the book, where Confucius is described as aspiring to pass the national examinations and become part of the imperial civil service (pp. 201-202) , which, of course, is utterly anachronistic. I hesitate to mention such technical points because, on one level, it is patently unfair to be critical in this way: the book does not purport to be a scholarly study. As Berthrong herself declares in the introduction:
In this book I have taken liberties that traditional students of Chinese culture might find downright scandalous, but I do so for a very good reason. I want to make the often hackneyed, manipulated, or lofty maxims attributed to Confucius accessible and applicable to you, the aware and thoughtful reader. (p. 4) At another level, though, these occasional technical errors are indicative of a more global devil-take-the-details attitude that occasionally becomes a liability.
The dichotomy Berthrong sets up between being either hackneyed or fast and loose with the facts is, I believe, a false one. Just because most scholars write in an impenetrable and boring manner does not mean someone writing a popular, lively book cannot also strive to be as historically accurate as possible.
If there is one thing that Confucius did teach, it is that we need to take the past seriously. I have always been strangely fond of a laconic passage from book 7: 7.18 The Master used the classical pronunciation when reciting the Odes and the History, and when conducting ritual. In all of these cases, he used the classical pronunciation.
The point is, as far as we can tell, that Confucius's contemporaries had begun updating things a bit, reading the classics and performing ritual in their contemporary dialects rather than the transmitted, "classic" pronunciation of the Western Zhou-a bit like performing the Catholic Mass in the vernacular rather than Latin. Confucius resisted this trend, like many of the deviations from tradition so popular among his contemporaries, insisting on strict conformity to the old ways. Pedantic? Perhaps.
But this is, of course, the central point of the Analects: the past has something to say, and hearing that something requires a bit of work on our part. This is why, as annoying as we are, the world needs pedants: when we are doing our jobs correctly, we are making a contribution to the general human intellectual and moral good by protecting the strangeness of the cultural and historical Other, and by helping it to resist the intellectual imperialism of the modern Western mind. Confucianism is relevant to modern life, but one of the reasons it is relevant is because it often has something to say that is different from what we are prepared to hear-because it presents a view of the Good that is different in important respects from our own, and, therefore, that can serve a valuable corrective function. In this respect, entirely remaking the past into our own likeness cheats us of an opportunity truly to learn, and that is surely not what Confucius would have wanted.
With these reservations noted, it is also important to recognize that most contemporary scholarship on Confucianism is rather impenetrable and dull, and thus of limited pedagogical value for the nonspecialist. At its best, Berthrong's work provides the sort of vivid, creative insight into the Confucian tradition that does give the modern reader a different perspective on ethics, personal character, and proper social relations. Analects 2.10 somewhat cryptically reads, "Look at the means a man employs, observe the basis from which he acts, and discover where it is that he feels at ease. Where can he hide? Where can he hide?" Especially in an unannotated version of the text, the nonspecialist is likely to be mystified as to the significance of this comment, and to pass over it without a second thought.
Berthrong's discussion on "maintaining civility" relates passages such as this to contemporary concerns in an accurate and refreshingly straightforward way:
More is told by nuances of language usage, body posture, and attitude than by responses to factual questions. If you want to know the caliber of a person, talk about what they do in their spare time, not about how many deals they closed last month. . . . Pay attention to how they speak to the receptionist and the security guard. Find out where they left the coffee cup when they finished with it. Civil behavior extends down to the small things, and indeed, those small things are important simply because there are so many of them. (p. 133) For a society obsessed with abstract and "objective" measures of excellence, this is important advice. Berthrong similarly brings Confucius's attitude toward the relative value of legal restrictions and moral example to life by observing that "you can set rules for everything-and even get most people to follow them, at least for a time, but if the rules aren't based on common decency people won't follow them for long" (p. 135). We could not wish for a better updating of Analects 2.3 ("If you try to guide the common people with coercive regulations and keep them in line with punishments, they will become evasive and will have no sense of shame"), or a more important corrective to a perhaps excessive Western emphasis on the rule of law.
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To conclude, then, an accessible, conversational treatment of Confucianism such as What Would Confucius Do?-especially when supplemented with more scholarly and historically accurate sources-can play a helpful and important role in introducing one of the world's great religious and philosophical traditions to the general reader.
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